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The concept of value chain upgrading and promotion has been proposed as a vehicle for small -holder farmers in 
developing countries to gain access to higher value markets and thus generate greater income for their families and 
communities. However, there are many instances where investments in upgrading have not generated the expected 
outcomes. One of the contributing factors has been that existing approaches focus more on who does what rather 
than the real problem to be addressed. A chain failure framework on the other hand focuses attention on the core 
problem and the appropriate response, rather than on who does what. It takes a system view rather than a f unction 
or component view, and it starts from the supposition that the only reason for intervening in a value chain is to 
increase chain surplus, where chain surplus is properly measured to include any chain or social externalities.  In this 
paper we review some of the existing literature on value chain upgrading and promotion as proposed for 
developing country situations, outline the essential elements of the chain failure/chain good theory and its 
relationship to the club goods literature, and then assess whether the chain upgrading and promotion literature can 
be reconfigured as a chain failure/chain good problem, using a number of published case studies.  Finally, we discuss 
various types of governance models used in agricultural value chains in developing  countries and suggest how well 
they might align with the chain failure/chain good approach. 
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1 Introduction 
The concept of value chain upgrading and promotion has been proposed as a vehicle for small-holder 
farmers in developing countries to gain access to higher value markets and thus generate greater income 
for their businesses, their families and their communities (UNIDO 2011, FAO 2014, OECD et al. 2014, 
Taglioni and Winkler 2016). It is the accepted approach in almost all international development 
institutions. As well as increasing economic growth and trade flows, there is often an explicit focus on the 
role of upgrading and promotion in ameliorating and reducing poverty, so pub lic policy is an issue in such 
proposals (Mitchell 2011). However, there is growing worldwide concern about large food production, 
processing and retailing firms forming private, closed-loop value chains and networks, and the 
consequent lack of transparency of value chain outcomes to public policy scrutiny (Griffith et al. 2015). 
For example, there is an extensive literature on the growing presence and impact of global supermarket 
chains in developing countries. Under such conditions, the ability of industr ies or even governments to 
protect and promote competitive food markets, and to alleviate poverty, has been questioned.  
Since value chain outcomes fall between public and private good outcomes, there has been confusion 
about which theoretical frameworks to use to analyse such problems. We have developed a different way 
of analysing food value chains that complements the existing public finance theory. This relies on 
concepts of chain failure (inefficiencies or impediments that prevent maximisation of value  chain 
surplus), chain externalities (unpriced spill-overs and spill-ins across the value chain boundaries) and 
chain goods (goods and services that are collectively provided for the whole chain that ameliorate chain 
failure or internalise chain externalities) (Griffith et al. 2015, Fleming et al. 2015). These concepts provide 
new ways to analyse the performance of food value chains. Some limited validation of these concepts has 
been undertaken for the Australian beef and wine industries (Grant et al. 2013,  Mounter et al. 2016), but 
if the concepts are to be globally relevant they need to be tested across a range of different industries 
and different institutional, policy and consumer environments.  
In this paper we review some of the existing literature on value chain upgrading and promotion as 
proposed for developing country situations, outline the essential elements of the chain 
goods/externalities theory and its relationship to the club goods literature, and then assess whether the 
chain upgrading and promotion literature can be reconfigured as a chain good/externality problem using 
a number of published case studies. 
2 Existing literature on value chain upgrading in developing countries 
2.1 The older value chain toolkits 
Value chain upgrading and promotion is defined slightly differently in many of the resource toolkits (see 
for example Kaplinsky and Morris 2001, Springer-Heinze 2007, DFID 2008, Agrifood Chain Toolkit 2016). 
Many of these toolkits have an explicit focus on pro-poor development. 
The definition from the ValueLinks manual (Springer-Heinze 2007, p. 77) is as follows: 
“Formulating a strategy to develop a value chain always has two dimensions. The first concerns what the 
actors in a value chain must do to become more competitive and to generate gr eater value added in the 
future. The joint improvement of the value chain by private enterprises and their associations is called 
“value chain upgrading” in the remainder of this manual….The second dimension of strategy concerns the 
role of external facilitators, i.e. government and donor agencies running an economic development 
programme. External facilitators do not engage in upgrading directly. Rather, they facilitate upgrading 
and provide assistance without becoming chain actors themselves. This activity is called “value chain 
promotion”, and logically refers to the upgrading strategy pursued by the operators”.  
The ValueLinks manual (p.79) goes on to talk about an upgrading vision, which refers to the overall goal 
of chain development in the interest of operators.  
“Thus, the vision always refers to 
• improving chain revenue (value creation), i.e. generating a higher sales volume and/or achieving better 
prices, and 
• the income of chain operators (value capturing)”. 
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However, the way it is explained is still about chain operators improving what they are doing, usually by 
adopting new technology relevant to their particular functional area, with the longer term (and 
secondary) goal of increasing chain revenue. 
The M4P Toolbook (DFID 2008, Tool 5, pp.73-88) splits the concept of upgrading into three parts: process 
upgrading (improving the efficiency of production); product upgrading (introducing new products or 
improving old products); and functional upgrading (deciding which activities the actor in the chain  should 
concentrate on). Of 15 key questions to be answered when analysing options for demand -driven 
upgrading, it is not until question 13 that proponents are asked : “is investment in upgrading worthwhile? 
does it bring enough added value to the poor?”. 
In the section on identifying opportunities for upgrading, there are the following two quotes (p.83) “In 
the search for upgrading possibilities it is important to look at the effect of the upgrade on the whole 
value chain”, and “In order to improve the performance of the whole value chain it is important to 
determine the most effective level in the value chain to upgrade.”  
While there are these statements that upgrading should be assessed on a whole-of-chain basis, most of 
the discussion in this Tool is about specific technologies. It is only towards the end that there is any 
discussion of the types of services required to support an upgrading push (chain promotion) and little 
discussion of coordination mechanisms or governance requirements to ensure that upg rading is effective 
in meeting development objectives. 
2.2 Examples of ineffective upgrading 
There are numerous instances where an uncritical following of the narrow concepts of upgrading has not 
produced the desired outcome. For example, in the South African wine industry, Ponte and Ewert and 
colleagues (Ponte 2007, Ponte and Ewert 2009, Ewert and Hanf 2015) show that a better industry 
outcome does not necessarily follow from a higher value added. They argue that two issues may 
circumvent any upgrading strategy. First, value chain actors need full knowledge of the underlying market 
segments and their requirements. For example, “...upgrading activit ies have co-existed with demands for 
higher volumes of basic quality wines and hence increasing demands for bulk delivery instead of 
packaged wine. As the marketing of bulk wine results in lower marketing costs, and higher yields can be 
achieved with lower quality grapes, overall profits have been better than the ones resulting from 
traditional upgrading activities.” (Ewert and Hanf 2015, p. 4). 
Second, the chain governance structure is most important. Upgrading into design, marketing and 
branding (to back up technical quality improvement) might be hindered if the chain is governed by a 
multinational enterprise (or its agent). Such enterprises have no interest in transferring these core skills 
to their suppliers, thus preventing them from accessing global markets (except as a raw material supplier 
for their first world customers (Ewert and Hanf 2015, p. 3))2. These authors then use a number of case 
studies of South African wineries to assess the role of governance structure and the influencing strategies 
used by the customers to shape various decisions about upgrading. 
Another case of at least partial failure is the investment in the upgrading of the Kenyan green bean value 
chain. The industry has invested considerable sums in product development and diversification and 
quality control systems to meet the requirements of high value export markets. There has also been a  
large investment in marketing (World Bank 2005). However, the expected higher unit values have not 
materialised and the industry has received low prices in the international market. Product specifications 
have become much more stringent than expected with a tight focus on phytosanitary standards, pesticide 
residues and any form of contamination (FPEAK 2013). 
Even though Kenya has preferential tax-free access into the European Union (EU), the EU entry standards 
are strictly enforced. This results in significant inspection delay which quickly diminishes product shelf 
life. Industry bodies claim that of vegetable exports exported to the EU in January 2013, one fifth was 
rejected at the point of entry due to pesticide contamination (FPEAK 2013). In addition, some of the 
importing companies (supermarkets) require even more quality attributes (freshness, special product 
treatments, added declarations, etc.). Obviously, the upgrading investment into product development has 
not been matched by other required investments in raw material quality processes. It is claimed that 
about 5,000 small scale Kenyan farmers have given up on green bean production and switched to other 
enterprises. Gachukia (2016) points to failures in governance arrangements as a strong contributi ng 
factor to the lack of success from the upgrading investment in this value chain.  
                                                 
2
 See also the similar discussion in Humphrey and Schmitz (2000). 
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There are many other similar examples that can be reviewed. Fromm (2007) reports the results from a 
sample of more than 100 smallholders across three different industries in Honduras. Most had adopted 
some form of process or product upgrading, but only a few had adopted either functional upgrading or 
chain upgrading. Process and product upgrading are usually thought of as improvements in the farm 
production system, and as such are relatively easy to adopt if profitable; improvements in the post farm 
gate part of the value chain are much harder for producers to undertake as there is often no mechanism 
for the benefits which accrue higher up the chain to be transmitted back to producers. This requires 
whole of chain investments. 
2.3 The newer value chain literature 
More recent publications have started to move away from the narrow definitions of value chain 
upgrading. For example, Baker et al. (2016), Bokelmann (2015), Trienekens (2011), Mitchell (2011) and 
Mitchell et al. (2009) among others are explicitly calling for the question of value chain upgrading to be 
thought of as a system problem and to require a value proposition. For example, Mitchell et al. (2009) 
propose a broader menu of seven different upgrading strategies, and highlight some key conditions for 
success including “clarity on the rationale for the (possible) intervention”, and “rigour in applying 
research methodology”. In explaining the latter point, they note (p.4) that “Value chain analysis and 
development requires robust evidence-based research of the current market system and a clear 
appreciation of which blockages poor people can overcome and how”.  
Other writers highlight the requirement for not only vertical investments in the commercial chain but also 
(and concurrently) horizontal investments in the enabling conditions, particularly coordination 
mechanisms and governance structures. Giuliani et al. (2005, p.  550) argue that successful upgrading by 
individual firms depends on both the collective efficiency of the regional cluster in which the firm 
operates, and the pattern of governance of the corresponding value chain. 
An excellent summary of this current thinking is provided by FAO (2014, pp. viii -ix), with their 10 
principles of Sustainable Food Value Chain Development (SFVCD): 
“The approach is not about simply developing long lists of often well -known constraints and then 
recommending that they be tackled one by one. Rather, SFVCD takes a holistic approach t hat identifies 
the interlinked root causes of why value-chain actors do not take advantage of existing end-market 
opportunities. 
The ten principles are grouped in three phases of a continuous development cycle. In the first phase, 
measuring performance, the value chain is assessed in terms of the economic, social and environmental 
outcomes it delivers today relative to a vision of what it could deliver in the future (Principles 1, 2, and 3). 
SFVCD programmes should target value chains with the greatest gap between actual and potential 
performance. 
In the second phase, understanding performance, the core drivers of performance (or the root causes of 
underperformance) are exposed by taking three key issues into account: how value chain stakeholders 
and their activities are linked to each other and to their economic, social and natural environments 
(Principle 4); what drives the behaviour of individual stakeholders in their business interactions (Principle 
5); and how value is determined in end markets (Principle 6). 
The third phase, improving performance, follows a logical sequence of actions: developing, based on the 
analysis conducted in phase 2, a specific and realistic vision and an associated core value chain 
development strategy that stakeholders have agreed upon (Principle 7), and selecting the upgrading 
activities and multilateral partnerships that support the strategy and that can realistically achieve the 
scale of impact envisioned (Principle 8, 9, and 10).”  
Note that these principles attempt to synthesise both the economic development motive (second phase) 
and the pro-poor development motive (third phase). 
Although we fully support the sentiments expressed in these recent writings, we prefer to formalise these 
suggestions for change by using a value chain failure framework. Thus we prefer to start from the 
outcome of chain surplus and ask whether chain surplus is at the maximum or not and if not, why not. 
Chain upgrading and promotion is then a response to an impediment in the chain, not whether a 
particular new technology or process is available. Further, we are less concerned about who does it and 
more concerned that it is the right response for the specified impediment. Our definition of value chain 
upgrading follows from Porter (1990), Humphrey and Schmitz (2002) and Giuliani et al. (2005) that it is 
“the capacity of a firm to innovate to increase the value added of its products and processes”, that is, to 
add to chain surplus. Such innovation can take a wide variety of forms and may occur anywhere in the 
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value chain. 
3 Elements of the chain goods theory and its relationship to the club goods literature 
The impediment in the value chain preventing the achievement of maximum chain surplus is what we call 
chain failure. 
The concept of chain failure is analogous to that of market failure used widely in the microeconomics 
literature, namely a situation of economic inefficiency caused by market imperfections. Economic 
efficiency is a concept normally applied to a national economy but can be adapted to smaller  economic 
systems such as value chains. 
Hence, we define chain failure as a situation in which a value chain fails to maximise chain surplus 
because it supplies a suboptimal level of throughput and value: at least one chain participant can be 
made better off without another participant being made potentially worse off. It can be determined by 
ascertaining where chain economic surplus (the sum of consumer surplus and producer surplus) is at a 
maximum. If we ignore equity concerns, the degree to which chain economic surplus is less than its 
potential maximum value shows the extent of chain failure. In principle and with data permitting, we 
could measure this by using concepts of whole-of-chain isoquants and iso-cost curves, and whole-of-chain 
production possibilities and iso-revenue curves (Mounter et al. 2016). Chain failure can occur as a result 
of the absence in the value chain of chain goods, or the presence of chain bads, positive and negative 
chain externalities, or asymmetric information leading to adverse selection, moral hazard and the 
principal-agent problem. It can also arise from the many forms of market failure originating from outside 
the value chain. 
The concept of a chain good from a theoretical point of view can be considered as analogous to a c lub 
good where the club comprises all members of a value chain (Sandler 2013). A club good is a sub -type of 
a public good, and populates the space between a public good and a private good. A  reason for the 
importance of this theory is that club membership size is an endogenous choice related to the decision to 
provide a shared good. But a decision to pay for ‘membership’ is not always a purely endogenous choice 
because often the decisions to engage in the governance of a value chain and to set a fee to pay for this 
governance are made by an outside party, often a supranational, national, regional or local government.  
Non-excludability and non-rivalry in consumption are the criteria applied in assessing whether a good can 
be described as a public good. Non-excludability means if one person consumes a good, other people 
cannot be excluded also from consuming it. Non-rivalry in consumption means that one person’s use of a 
good does not diminish its availability to other consumers. A pure public good is both non -rival and non-
excludable; conversely, a pure private good is both excludable and rival. Club goods (and therefore from 
our viewpoint, chain goods) are essentially public goods with selective excludability.  
Thus chain goods are those types of goods and services that are collectively supplied and allow effective 
coordination across value chain partners. They resemble what used to be called the facilitating functions 
of agricultural markets. These functions make possible the smooth performance of the exchange  and 
physical functions and are not directly involved in either the exchange of title or the physical handling of 
products. However, without them the modern marketing system would not be possible. The four key 
groupings of facilitating functions – standardisation, financing, risk-bearing, and market intelligence – 
have to be collectively or jointly supplied. 
We define a negative chain externality as a cost incurred by a participant in the value chain that is 
imposed on a third party who is not directly engaged in producing, trading in or consuming the good 
causing the cost, but this participant does not compensate the third party for bearing the cost. We define 
a positive chain externality as a benefit received by a third party who is not directly engaged in  
producing, trading in or consuming the good providing the benefit, but this third party does not 
compensate the participant in the value chain who provides the benefit.  
A study of chain externalities rests on the analytical framework used to study chain g oods, in that chain 
goods may be treated as extreme cases of goods with positive chain externalities. Alternatively, chain 
bads may be treated as extreme cases of goods with negative chain externalities. When a unit of a good is 
produced or consumed that beneficially (adversely) affects third parties but entails no market 
transaction, a positive (negative) externality occurs. When this production or consumption beneficially 
(adversely) affects everybody in a given population (in our case, chain participants), the good or service 
has chain good (bad) characteristics. While these conditions suggest we could simplify discussions by 
referring simply to positive and negative chain externalities that subsume chain goods and bads, 
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respectively, another condition suggests that this approach is unwise. Public goods (bads) do not have a 
market because it is beneficial to nobody to provide (eliminate) them, whereas chain externalities 
typically but not always occur in situations in which markets operate, albeit imperfectly from the chain’s 
and/or society’s viewpoint. Hence, the economic analysis of these concepts will differ.  
The existence of negative or positive externalities among participants of a value chain too can be 
explained in terms of the size of the transaction costs of individuals acting to reduce negative 
externalities or to supply more of something which has positive externalities. It may be that only by 
acting jointly can the transaction costs per individual be reduced sufficiently relative to the individua l’s 
share of benefits that it warrants something that causes a negative externality being reduced or a 
positive externality being supplied. The cost of making the joint effort is the fee associated with club 
good membership.   
If we wish to apply these concepts in practice we will need to consider the whole network of 
organisations and value-producing activities involved in the production and delivery of an offering to the 
end customer. In this situation, chain failure occurs if there is a lack of or a poorly performing network 
good, and positive and negative chain externalities refer to a participant in this particular network of 
firms. An example of chain failure might be the lack of a uniform and credible product description scheme 
for beef (Griffith et al. 2015). 
4 Reconfiguring chain upgrading as a chain good/externality problem 
The provision of chain goods and the internalisation of chain externalities that increase chain surplus can 
be viewed as forms of market innovation. There is therefore a direct l ink with value chain upgrading and 
promotion, which we have defined above as innovation to add value in a chain. Further, following the 
arguments of Mitchell et al. (2009), taking a chain failure approach automatically provides “robust 
evidence-based research of the current market system and a clear appreciation of which blockages poor 
people can overcome and how.” Consider some examples of the provision of a chain good and 
internalisation of positive and negative chain externalities.  
Examples of chain goods are merit goods, RD&E, and chain-wide standards and certification. Merit goods 
are of special interest to policy makers in developing countries because they are socially beneficial 
regardless of consumers’ preferences. That is, the social benefit of consumption exceeds the private 
benefit. Three key questions on merit goods from a food value chain perspective are: what qualifies as a 
merit good, how should merit goods be paid for, and should they be supplied through the public or 
private sector? Merit goods abound in food value chains, associated with the social benefits from the 
availability and affordability of foods that most contribute to a good diet, health, food safety, a 
sustainable environment and greater equity. The growing consideration of human health outcomes from 
agricultural R&D investments is a recognition of the role of merit goods. Training provided within a value 
chain might also be classed as a merit good. 
RD&E is commonly viewed as a public good where it does not pay an individual or fir m to undertake the 
research and its benefits flow to people throughout society. The outcomes of some RD&E activities are 
worth undertaking by chain participants so long as their net benefits are positive, even if some benefits 
flow to individuals and firms beyond the chain boundaries.  
Examples of positive chain externalities are uniform grading or classification schemes (and associated 
indicators of product quality), and facilitating information and knowledge flow along the chain.  The 
presence of uniform grading or classification schemes in food value chains is an example of a positive 
chain externality. It may not pay an individual chain participant to introduce such a scheme but all 
participants could benefit from it if it was jointly developed and implemented. Facilitating information 
and knowledge flow along the chain adds value by enabling consumers to match their demands better to 
goods and services supplied in the chain.  
Examples of negative chain externalities are practices undertaken in a food valu e chain that damage the 
environment, and actions by one or a few chain participants that damage the reputation of the products 
and firms within the chain. It is worth chain participants as a group undertaking actions to reduce or 
eliminate these negative externalities so long as the net benefits to them are positive, even if some 
benefits of their actions spill over to individuals and firms beyond the chain boundary. 
Each of these scenarios may be considered to be examples of chain failure. By taking this perspective, we 
focus attention on the core problem of sub-optimal level of chain surplus. This focus forces us to consider 
all of the elements of chain surplus – the efficient combination of inputs used; the efficient combinations 
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of outputs supplied; and the efficient matching of the costs of acquiring inputs and the revenues from 
marketing outputs. The traditional chain upgrading and promotion perspective on the other hand, 
considers only part of the puzzle, and as we have shown above, there are many inst ances where 
recommendations for investments in upgrading and promotion have been made without any 
consideration of the impacts on chain surplus. 
4 Forms of governance of food value chains: theoretical consistency with the chain 
failure/good/externality approach 
One of the key factors facilitating a chain failure perspective is the governance in the value chains of 
interest (Guiliani et al. 2005). Here, we discuss various governance models used in agricultural value 
chains in developing countries and suggest how well they might align with the chain 
failure/good/externality approach. This extends the typology of governance structures put forward by 
Humphrey and Schmitz (2000) for example. 
Statutory marketing authority model: a top-down approach whereby the government both regulates and 
undertakes marketing activities throughout the chain. Such a model has a poor track record that crowds 
out innovation, limits the ability to anticipate and respond to changes in market conditions, and breeds 
inefficiency throughout the chain. It is theoretically inconsistent with the chain good/externality 
approach as there is no allowance for independent actors in the chain who have an incentive to maximise 
chain surplus. 
Cooperative marketing model: a bottom-up approach whereby producers voluntarily form a cooperative 
to undertake marketing activities throughout the chain. Again, such a model generally has a poor track 
record in developing countries for all the usual reasons why cooperatives struggle to maintain 
profitability and little pressure to innovate, but has had some success in developed countries where 
innovation has been prominent. New types of cooperative business models are being applied. It is 
theoretically consistent with the chain good/externality approach in part b ecause it allows for some 
internalisation of externalities and provision of public goods but does not cover all chain participants.  
Endogenous model of independent actors: an approach closely aligned to the club goods literature where 
independent actors in the value chain initiate a club for joint action. There is considerable pressure to 
innovate but it is difficult to initiate without external pressure. It is theoretically consistent with the chain 
good/externality approach. Examples include horizontal and vertical alliances. 
Exogenous model of independent actors: this approach is also aligned to the club goods literature where 
the government regulates for levies to be collected to fund joint action by independent actors in the 
value chain. It has been successfully introduced into a number of food value chains in Australia with 
strong pressure from government to innovate, but raises a number of questions about how to ensure 
success can be sustained over the long term, as there are sometimes significant ineq ualities in who pays 
and who benefits. It is theoretically consistent with the chain good/externality approach.  
Endogenous leadership model: in this approach a dominant organisation in the food value chain takes the 
lead in integrating marketing activities throughout the chain, as best exemplified by the actions of 
supermarkets. This can be an efficient approach but prone to displays of excessive market power, and 
mixed evidence on innovation (subject to incumbency inertia). It is in part theoretically cons istent with 
the chain good/externality approach in that the leading firm(s) may internalise some externalities.  
Fully integrated corporate model: in this approach a private firm (e.g. supermarket) controls activities 
throughout the chain, including specifications given to food producers. This can be an efficient approach 
with strong control of product quality but prone to displays of excessive market power, and mixed 
evidence on innovation (subject to incumbency inertia). It is theoretically inconsistent wi th the chain 
good/externality approach in that chain goods are aligned with private goods and the firm has the 
capability to internalise all chain externalities. 
Aid model: a mixed model similar to the exogenous model of independent actors but funding come s from 
aid sources to implement activities for local chain participants and provide them with training and 
resources. It is prone to the criticism that chain participants revert to the old ways when the aid funding 
runs out. A variation on this is that donors do not directly implement activities for local chain participants 
but instead provide them with training and resources so that they can test ideas about what works best 
and is profitable to adopt, with the longer term objective that the local chain participants take over when 
the funding runs out. Both versions are theoretically consistent with the chain good/externality approach.  
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5 Concluding comments 
We argue in this paper that club goods theory can be effectively applied to food value chains in 
developing countries to assess and improve their performance. Application of the theory enables 
governments to make informed decisions on whether or not to intervene in these chains in particular 
circumstances and, if they are to intervene, where and how they can have optimal effect. It also provides 
guides as to the choice of optimal size of “clubs” in the chain, the use of fees to belong  and at which 
level, the best form of their governance, and who is likely to join.  
Therefore, decisions on chain upgrading and chain promotion can be reconfigured under the broader 
framework of value chain failure/goods/externalities. Using the chain failure framework focuses attention 
on the core problem and the appropriate response, rather than on who does what. It takes a sys tem view 
rather than a function or component view, and it starts from the supposition that the only reason for 
intervening in a value chain is to increase chain surplus, where chain surplus is properly measured to 
include any chain or social externalities such as motives for pro-poor development. 
Chain governance models are seen to be a key critical success factor for the creation of additional chain 
surplus in developing country food value chains, and an appropriate governance model is crucial to the 
success of any chain upgrading investment. 
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